Apollo stands as a key financing partner for some of the most innovative sectors driving our future.
The Fed survey below for the third quarter of 2026 shows that only 19% of firms report that financing costs or access to credit are constraining their investment and spending plans, while 81% report no such constraints. The bottom line is that corporate America is saying that monetary policy is not restrictive.
Note: Data for 2026 Q3. Sources: CFO survey, Are Firms Financially Constrained? | Richmond Fed, Apollo Chief Economist
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Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings, see chart below.
If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.
Sources: Ramp AI Index, Apollo Chief Economist
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October 21, 2026
Compute demand is significantly greater than supply, so the speed of the data center buildout matters. Who are the winners and losers if the buildout takes longer?
Winners
Losers
For chipmakers, the outcome of a delay is more mixed. Chip demand stays strong, but if sites cannot energize fast enough, chip deliveries could outrun installation and delay revenue.
The key distinction for investors is delay versus cancellation. A delay hurts returns by pushing cash flows out, but the asset remains and may become more valuable. The real risk is that scarcity unwinds, for example, if supply catches up in a rush or demand softens, which would erode the premium on existing capacity.
The bottom line for investors is that a delay would favor assets tied to scarce physical capacity, such as operating data centers, power producers and long-lead equipment makers, while assets priced on on-time delivery would underperform, notably AI-linked equities with high multiples and the debt of leveraged developers. Chipmakers face mainly timing risk, and hyperscaler bonds face mostly spread risk rather than default risk. The broader market would be exposed through the weight of AI names in major indices and through slower growth.
Sources: Americas-AI-Surge-Powering-Growth-in-Every-State.pdf, Data Centers – Database, Apollo Chief Economist
Sources: US Data Center Map — Project List & Tracker, Cleanview, Apollo Chief Economist
Sources: Cleanview, Apollo Chief Economist
Note: 100MW hyperscaler greenfield AI-optimized data center, 12-year life cycle plus terminal value, GB200 NVL 72, financed by internal free cash flow. Average of grid interconnect and behind-the-meter "bridge" scenarios. Sources: Carnegie Endowment International AI Data Center Model, Apollo Chief Economist
Sources: Cushman & Wakefield (Data Center Construction Cost Guide 2026), Apollo Chief Economist
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October 20, 2026
Silicon Valley operates on the premise that compute demand is unlimited, yet the recent slowdown in token spending growth suggests that this appetite may exist only when compute is effectively free, see first chart below.
In reality, compute appears to face a flat, highly price-sensitive demand curve, where even modest changes in token prices can drive buyers to throttle usage or substitute cheap open-source alternatives.
Silicon Valley’s conviction of infinite demand for compute collapses because it fundamentally ignores price, as productivity returns for firms on their AI investments are either arriving far slower than projected or failing to materialize at all, turning what was pitched as an essential growth engine into a margin-draining cost center.
The squeeze is showing up on the supply side too. Return on invested capital for the five largest hyperscalers is declining, as invested capital grows faster than the earnings it generates, see second chart below.
The core economic flaw in the AI bull case is that the marginal cost of producing compute exceeds the marginal benefit it delivers to users, raising questions about claims of unlimited demand for data centers. How much compute and how many data centers are needed depends on the returns firms are able to generate with that compute. So far, the AI payoff for firms has been slow to materialize, implying a growing reluctance to pay for AI services. That is consistent with the ongoing slowdown in token spending among corporate customers.
Ultimately, the number-one variable governing the viability of data center construction models is not physical capacity or power; it is the actual price users are willing to pay for the compute being built, and companies will only pay a high price for that compute if they are able to turn the compute into higher top-line growth, bigger profit margins or substantial cost savings, little of which is showing up at scale yet. Maybe that will come in the future. Maybe not.
Sources: Ramp Al Index, Apollo Chief Economist
Note: Hyperscalers include Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle. ROIC = trailing-12-month (EBIT − taxes) / (equity + debt − cash & short-term investments). Sources: Bloomberg, Apollo Chief Economist
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October 19, 2026
M&A is on pace for a near-record year, driven by the ongoing rapid technological change that is forcing firms to adapt to a new world.
In the first nine months, 42 deals topped $10 billion, worth over $1.1 trillion, or 36% of all M&A value, see charts below. Big is getting bigger.
The bottom line is that the speed of change in AI, energy, infrastructure, defense and financial services has triggered action among many corporates, and the need for long-term, flexible capital to finance this change is enormous.
For more discussion, see also here.
Written by Huw van Steenis and Torsten Slok
Note: 2026 data as of 3Q 2026. Sources: S&P Capital IQ, Apollo European and Policy Strategist
Sources: S&P Capital IQ, Apollo European and Policy Strategist
Note: 2026 data as of September 30, 2026. Sources: EY analysis of Dealogic data, Apollo European and Policy Strategist
Sources: S&P Capital IQ, Apollo European and Policy Strategist
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Germany is hosting its Invest in Germany Summit this week, against the backdrop of rising investment needs in AI, infrastructure, defense and energy resilience.
Meeting these longer-term investment needs will require public and private capital across both credit and equity markets. And Germany starts with a relatively small pool of domestic institutional capital.
Germany has the least-funded pension system of any major advanced economy. Funded pension assets are only around 7% of GDP against 149% in Sweden and 185% in Canada. Furthermore, German occupational pension schemes allocate just 14% to equities, compared with 34% across the EU and around 50% in the US, see chart below.
Yet Germany has the highest household savings rate in Europe, with much of household wealth held in deposits.
This is why pension reform matters beyond retirement policy. The reforms now under way could ultimately generate around €90 billion of new annual funded pension flows, equivalent to roughly 2% of GDP.
The bottom line is that Germany is trying to increase investment at the same time as it builds a much larger domestic pool of long-term savings. Pension reform could help connect the two.
We look at the numbers, the reforms and the implications for capital markets in our new presentation on German pension reform, available here.
Written by Huw van Steenis
Sources: European Commission (2025), Staff Working Document, Table 35 (EU); Federal Reserve, Financial Accounts Z.1, Table S.129.s (US); Pensions Policy Institute (2025), Pension Scheme Assets, Figure 2 (UK); and Statistics Canada (2025), Trusteed Pension Funds, Q4 2024 (Canada); caveat: figures are not fully comparable, as the EU covers occupational pension institutions, the US includes public and private pensions and non-equity mutual funds, the UK includes broader retirement assets but excludes private equity, and Canada includes public and private occupational pensions with equity exposure estimated from reported data, Apollo European and Policy Strategist.
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Duration measures how sensitive a bond’s price is to changes in interest rates, and for the 30-year Treasury, it has fallen from 25 years in 2020 to 14 today because of higher yields and higher coupons.
That means long Treasuries offer less cushion per dollar in a downturn.
As a result, investors may need to own more fixed income to hedge against the risk of a slowdown. Pairing Treasuries with high-quality credit can help.
Investment-grade private placements and infrastructure debt are often long-dated and fixed-rate, so they can carry meaningful duration, while asset-backed finance can add income, with duration varying by structure.
The bottom line is that when interest rates stay higher for longer, lower duration weakens the hedge that long Treasuries provide.
Sources: ICE BofAML, Macrobond, Apollo Chief Economist
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October 16, 2026
Let’s call the ongoing correction in AI assets "The AI Reset," where investors mark down their expectations for future cash flows.
What are the implications for the economy?
A sharp reset in AI expectations could undermine corporate confidence, trigger a pullback in capex and weigh on GDP growth, just as higher oil prices, tariffs and tighter immigration restrictions push inflation higher, raising the risk of a stagflationary environment in which growth slows even as price pressures persist.
Note: Bloomberg SHOK model scenario assumes a widening in global credit spreads of 10–30 bps, a 1–4% decline in US investment and a 1–3% decline in South Korean exports, with shocks phased in from 4Q26 and tapering through 4Q27. GDP impacts are shown as percentage deviations from baseline forecasts. Sources: Bloomberg SHOK, Apollo Chief Economist
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October 15, 2026
Higher interest rates have not slowed the data center buildout. Over the past year, 10-year yields are up 125 bps, yet consensus forecasts for 2027 capex growth have only been revised higher, see chart below.
The reason is that many AI investors expect AI investments to return more than 10%, well above the 4% Fed funds rate. With borrowing costs far below expected returns, the AI spending boom is not sensitive to interest rates, and tighter policy is losing its bite on the economy.
The implication for investors is that upward pressure on rates persists until either the Fed raises rates above expected AI returns, or expected AI returns fall below the Fed funds rate. With the consensus still very bullish on AI, see chart again, investors should expect continued upward pressure on rates.
A Middle East deal after the midterm elections could push yields lower via lower oil prices. But the fundamental direction of travel for rates remains higher, especially with ongoing fiscal challenges and heavy Treasury issuance adding to the term premium.
The bottom line for both public and private markets is that higher for longer continues.
Sources: Bloomberg, Macrobond, Apollo Chief Economist
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A new survey by Mavvrik and Benchmarkit of 396 enterprises finds that companies are adopting AI faster than they are building the financial controls to keep its costs in check.
Only 11% of firms forecast their AI spending within 10% of actual, down from 15% last year, see chart below.
The survey also shows that those misses are changing decisions, with 62% of firms saying an unexpected AI cost altered a business decision and one in four delaying or canceling an AI initiative.
The impact is showing up in profitability too, with 81% of companies reporting moderate-to-high gross margin impact from AI costs, including 63% who see a 6 to 15 percentage point decrease.
The bottom line is that we are still waiting for the ROI from AI investments, and this survey shows that while we wait, costs continue to surprise and become harder to predict and control.
Sources: Mavvrik and Benchmarkit, 2026 State of AI Cost Governance Report (n = 396, April-May 2026), Apollo Chief Economist
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